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Why were Western retailers blamed for the building collapse in
Bangladesh?
Assigning direct responsibility to retailers lets factory owners and governments
off the hook, write Brian Jacobs and Vinod Singhal
Rana Plaza, an eight-story building in Bangladesh that housed garment factories employing
approximately 5000 workers, collapsed on April 24, 2013. The resulting fatalities (over 1100) and
injuries (over 2400) made it one of the worst industrial accidents in history. The scale of this
tragedy and subsequent widespread press coverage put a spotlight on the risks and costs of
sourcing from low-cost countries.
Many in the media and at NGOs placed much of the blame on Western retailers that sourced
garments from Bangladesh, although the official accident investigation found that the building and
factory owners were the responsible parties. A common belief is that the risks and costs of
tragedies like Rana Plaza, as assessed by capital markets and consumers, are sufficient to
motivate firms to shift production sourcing to developed, high-cost countries rather than
developing, low-cost countries. In other words, it is assumed that capital market and consumer
market forces are sufficient to change firm sourcing behaviours.
To examine this assumption, we studied the stock market reaction to 39 global apparel retailers
with significant sourcing in Bangladesh at the time of the Rana Plaza disaster. We found that
although stock market reaction to retailers on the day of the Rana Plaza disaster was negative, its
magnitude and significance dissipated by the following day. There is also no evidence to suggest
that customers boycotted garments made in Bangladesh. On the contrary, garment exports from
Bangladesh actually increased in the months and years after the Rana Plaza disaster.
From a retailer perspective, since negative economic and consumer impacts from the Rana Plaza
disaster were insignificant, they have limited incentives to move sourcing out of Bangladesh to
other low-cost countries such as Cambodia and China, both of which have well-developed
garment industries, let alone to higher-cost countries in North America or Europe.
Our results suggest that the efforts of NGOs and the media to shame and guilt retailers into
accepting responsibility for the safety issues in the Bangladesh garment industry might be
misplaced. Paradoxically, retailers taking direct responsibility may create a moral hazard problem.
13/07/2017 LSE Business Review – Why were Western retailers blamed for the building collapse in Bangladesh?
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2017/07/11/why-were-western-retailers-blamed-for-the-building-collapse-in-bangladesh/ 2/3
Bangladesh suffers from a high level of government corruption as measured both by Transparency
International and the World Bank. At least 10 per cent of the Bangladeshi parliament members are
garment factory owners. These members use their influence to keep wages low and maintain
political clout for favourable treatment of the garment industry, including lax safety regulations.
If Western retailers assume direct responsibility in such corrupt and politically connected
environments, they risk becoming the scapegoat for factory owners that do not follow safety
guidelines. Further, requiring retailers to assume direct responsibility for factory safety could even
lead more retailers to leave Bangladesh since the possibility of future disasters cannot be ruled
out, and the possibility of being tainted in the future is not negligible. If retailers exit on a large
scale, garment workers in Bangladesh stand to lose.
In the wake of the Rana Plaza tragedy, major global retailers developed two different industry
agreements aimed at improving factory working conditions. The Accord on Fire and Building
Safety in Bangladesh (AFBSB) was established by a group dominated by European retailers,
international labor organizations, and NGOs. An alternative agreement, the Alliance for
Bangladesh Worker Safety (ABWS) was established by North American retailers. Instead of
retailers inspecting and monitoring independently, these accords enable a more coordinated and
cooperative effort, reducing duplication of inspections and monitoring, and providing better
transparency and sharing of information. These accords seem to be a reasonable course of action
for retailers to improve safety: monitor the workplace through inspections, identify deficiencies,
give factory owners time and support to fix the problems, and use the threat of taking away
business to ensure compliance.
The regulatory laws in Bangladesh are weak and the implementation is uneven and inconsistent.
The Bangladeshi government must set and consistently enforce clear and comprehensive
regulatory guidelines. The governments of buying firms in more developed economies can also
play a role by altering trade agreements to pressure Bangladesh to improve worker rights and
safety. For example, the US government suspended some trade privileges for Bangladesh as a
result of the Rana Plaza disaster, and the EU entered a sustainability compact with the
Bangladeshi government that included time-based actions to improve labor rights and factory
safety.
Without such governmental policies, it seems unlikely Bangladeshi worker safety would
substantively improve in the short term. The working conditions in Bangladesh might improve the
most quickly if NGOs agree with the investigators and capital markets that the blame belongs with
the factory owners who neglect safety, and with lax governmental enforcement, and then work
cooperatively with various stakeholders to proactively address those issues.
The Rana Plaza disaster comprises four key elements that aid in assessing the applicability of our
findings to other incidents: 1) the event had major, negative social impact with extensive media
coverage; 2) buyers were largely located in developed economies; 3) the supply base was
fragmented and opaque, and largely located in developing economies; and 4) consumer backlash
was limited. To the extent that other events share these elements, insignificant stock market
reactions might be expected. Unfortunately, these four factors are increasingly prevalent as supply
chains are extended to the developing world. Thus, policymakers should not rely on market forces
to reduce the likelihood of such tragedies, but will need to prepare, devise, and implement
prevention strategies.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This blog post is based on the authors’ paper The Effect of the Rana Plaza Disaster on
Shareholder Wealth of Retailers: Implications for Sourcing Strategies and Supply Chain
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